According to peasant leader Mauricio Contreras, from northern Cesar, what most defines the current situation for peasants is the imperialist onslaught ravaging the continent. “There is an explosion of factors shaping the changing situation in the country, which cannot be explained solely by the political and electoral situation. The broader factor relates to the domination of the peoples of Latin America and the reconfiguration of U.S. imperialism.”
Abelardo de la Espriella’s election follows the imperialist script, reflecting the kind of government the United States needs in our countries and the policies that, according to Donald Trump, will help Americans — or at least those in the ruling class — “grow up safe and sound.”
On the other hand, it is undeniable that, with or without fraud, Abelardo de la Espriella’s rhetoric of hate and confrontation has allowed him to expand his electoral support. Broad sectors of the population, including significant segments of the working classes, have welcomed his calls to “rip the left to shreds.” His characterization of President Gustavo Petro, his electoral rival Iván Cepeda, and those who sympathize with them as “bandits”; his defense of the use of force, arguing that “crime and banditry are not confronted with pretty words”; his rejection of “attempts to contaminate our children with gender ideology”; his proposal to strengthen religious education in schools; his opposition to abortion, expressed in statements such as “a country that murders its children has no future.”
Taken together, this rhetoric contributes to the normalization of aggression and the delegitimization of political opponents, the stigmatization of certain social groups, and the creation of internal enemies. It represents a step forward in the process of the fascistization of Colombian society.
This process has also manifested itself in the participation of farmworkers in repressive actions against peasant protests with the backing of local authorities, as well as in the repeated involvement of groups of alleged hooded university students in attacks against members of the student movement at public universities.
De la Espriella avoids explicitly stigmatizing the peasantry because he seeks to present himself as part of this sector. In fact, he has stated that his aspiration is to be a “full-time peasant” and projects that identity, even though his self-perception is based on his ownership of two vast estates — a condition that differs from the reality of the Colombian peasantry.
One of his farms is located between the La Cruz and La Hormiga marshes, in the northern department of Sucre.
According to the independent digital news outlet Mutante, this farm covers 391 hectares — 156 times larger than the average size of individual properties in the department of Sucre, where 43% of properties are 2.5 hectares or smaller.
The other is located in the municipality of Becerril, in the eastern part of the department of Cesar, and is part of the “mining corridor,” whose economy is based on coal extraction. It is situated on a mining concession granted to the multinational company Drummond and was once owned by the Rodríguez Fuentes family, passed down to their children, including Hugues Manuel Rodríguez — known as “Comandante Barbie” or “El Barbie” — a promoter of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) in Cesar and a frequent client of Abelardo de la Espriella at his law firm.
El Barbie, in addition to being a landowner and cattle rancher, has been convicted in Colombia for financing and promoting paramilitary groups, and in the United States for drug trafficking.
This estate covers 176 hectares, and its cadastral appraisal—twice what De la Espriella paid — amounts to 1,304,000 million Colombian pesos, although its market value could far exceed that figure due to the mining rights. This was revealed by the media outlet Vorágine.
Objectively speaking, De la Espriella has little in common with the small, independent rural producers who make up the peasantry. Rather, their interests are diametrically opposed, since the peasantry yearns for genuine agrarian reform — one that is “comprehensive and popular,” as the National Agrarian Coordinator puts it — which involves, among other things, taking land from powerful large landowners and distributing it to the poor.
The department of Cesar has been the scene of large-scale land recoveries by the peasant movement, aimed at redistributing land that “does not fulfill its social function,” and the land recoverers —peasants from the area — have suffered state and parastatal repression, including from the misnamed “Solidarity Brigades,” a paramilitary group affiliated with the far-right Colombian Federation of Cattle Ranchers (Fedegán).
Indalecio Dangond Baquero will serve as Minister of Agriculture beginning August 7. He has served as an advisor to the Ministry of Agriculture during the administrations of Andrés Pastrana, Álvaro Uribe Vélez, and Juan Manuel Santos.
According to the news outlet Cambio, in 2022–2023, Dangond Baquero “orchestrated the operation so that Juan José Lafaurie Cabal would receive $95,273,700 in taxpayer-funded grants and be granted a preferential ‘small producer’ loan of 400 million pesos.”
Lafaurie Cabal is the son of landowner José Félix Lafaurie Rivera, president and legal representative of Fedegán, and of María Fernanda Cabal, one of the leading figures of Colombia’s far right and a former presidential candidate for the pro-Uribe Centro Democrático party.
His “professional” career also includes work with the National Federation of Oil Palm Growers (FEDEPALMA) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) as a financial coordinator for agribusiness and sustainable alternative development programs.
His ties to FEDEPALMA and USAID are not coincidental. The oil palm, or African palm, was introduced to Colombia in the 1960s. However, it was with Plan Colombia — a counterinsurgency initiative disguised as an anti-narcotics project agreed upon by the U.S. and Colombian governments in the 1990s — that oil palm monoculture reached its peak, driven by the demand for new biofuels in the United States. A political-military framework — both legal and illegal — was constructed to facilitate its introduction.
USAID provided seed capital, organizational support, and risk-reduction initiatives; the government acted as an intermediary to disburse those funds and establish the legal infrastructure; and paramilitary groups “helped” concentrate land ownership, dispossessing thousands of peasants of their homes.
Vicente Castaño, founding leader of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), explained it this way: “In Urabá, we have palm plantations. I myself brought in businesspeople to invest in these projects, which are long-lasting and productive. The idea is to get the wealthy to invest in these kinds of projects in different parts of the country. When the wealthy come to these areas, state institutions follow. Unfortunately, state institutions only move toward these areas when the wealthy are there. We must bring the wealthy to every region of the country, and that is one of the missions shared by all the commanders.”
The track record of the man who will take over Colombia’s Ministry of Agriculture on August 7 is that of a figure close to far-right sectors, professionally linked to individuals and organizations known for their ties to paramilitarism, with a history of allegations regarding alleged acts of corruption, and with a career closely tied to programs promoted by the U.S. government.
Roberto Menko, a peasant leader from southern Bolívar, believes that “the priorities of this incoming government, based on what it has already shown, are big business. They’re interested in large mining companies and large-scale monoculture plantations.”
Yeiner Martínez, from northern Cesar, adds: “We already know that the confrontations are going to be more intense.”
Both emphasize that during Gustavo Petro’s administration, the institutional route was useful for making progress on land transfers, but many other issues were derailed by the alliances Petro formed to win the 2022 elections.
According to Menko, “the ministers were political appointees from those who supported him through the Liberal Party; another minister was a political appointee from those who supported him through the Conservative Party, and so on. That’s how alliances with the traditional parties work. That’s why, in many cases, government resolutions or actions were issued that were no different from those of previous administrations.”
But the incoming government is not like Gustavo Petro’s. It is not an administration that, although it declared itself supportive of small farmers, faced institutional limitations in more forcefully implementing its proposals for agrarian reform and mining sector reform — aimed at strengthening artisanal and small-scale mining in the face of the dominance of large mining companies, both domestic and transnational.
“I believe that the incentives for small farmers’ production — which have been very few — will come to an end, and those resources will be redirected toward palm oil and biofuels or other ventures,” Menko continues. “On the issue of mining, it’s even worse, because he’s interested in large-scale mining, not artisanal mining. He is involved in companies holding mining titles for gold in the municipalities of Santa Rosa and Montecristo, in southern Bolívar. Many small farmers were displaced — and even threatened — so that he could acquire a stake in those titles. Our right to protest is also at risk, because he has already threatened us not to hold demonstrations, sit-ins, or any other type of action to pressure for the strengthening of peasant production.”
“It’s a threatening government,” says a fellow leader from the Nuevo Amanecer Agroalimentary Peasant Territory in southern Cesar. In her view, the new government’s political agenda poses a risk to peasant communities and to land-reclamation efforts.
“We believe they may end up evicting all of us who are part of a land-reclamation process, even though the land is already legally ours — an achievement we secured as peasants during Gustavo Petro’s administration. We have the documents to prove it. But we’re worried that the paramilitaries will reorganize and that they’ll be the ones to come, in the middle of the night, to drive us off our land. As a leader of this community, I don’t want to have to leave the territory. I live right here, and over the past four years, they’ve seen our faces up close. This, of course, terrifies me a bit.”
Menko shares an anecdote that illustrates the situation:
“A few days ago, a farmer passed through a paramilitary checkpoint — the kind that’s fairly common in the area. There was a guy who seemed to be in charge, because he was speaking loudly and all that. He told the farmer, ‘Now we’re really going all out, because this government is going to help us.’”
“Of course, De la Espriella’s rhetoric scares people a bit. But the social movement in Colombia has a unique quality: it’s determined,” Menko reflects. “That counters fear and will mobilize people. Even if he criminalizes protest and persecutes leaders, he won’t stop us. Under this government, there will surely be many situations that force people to take to the streets. When people’s rights are violated, they will take to the streets. It seems that the institutional route is running out of options, and that will change how people feel,” they add from northern Cesar.
“We’ll have to look out for one another even more,” says the peasant leader from Nuevo Amanecer. “Our main strength has always been organization, solidarity, camaraderie, and the desire to protect our territory and remain on it.”
Martínez continues: “We just have to break the ice. Some community or territory has to take the initiative and set an example for the others. And we’re going to have to mobilize more people so that violating rights becomes more difficult and more costly for them.”
The organizational strength of social movements is a force to be reckoned with. All the leaders interviewed agree on this.
“We need to become more cohesive across organizations, but each organization has its own strength,” notes Menko. “Right now, people aren’t worn out. Under previous administrations, we had to take to the streets three or four times a year, and that takes a financial and physical toll. But in recent years, it’s been less frequent. Some say we didn’t build up our strength enough during Petro’s administration, and that may be true. But it’s also true that this allows us to be well-rested and ready for prolonged action, if necessary.”
It’s a time for study and analysis. “We have to understand the political, social, economic, and cultural phenomena of the moment. And based on that analysis, we must adjust our strategy to strengthen our tools,” Contreras notes. Menko echoes this, adding that “we have much to learn from the four years that are coming to a close, from the two hundred that preceded them, and from the four that lie ahead.”
But the greatest challenge for the peasant movement and the popular movement right now is unity. “We must work hard to achieve unity within the national movement. Over the past few years, there have been rifts and divisions due to the different positions each group took toward Petro’s government. Some supported everything he did; others supported what needed to be supported but not other things; and still others spent the entire time distanced from anything related to the Historic Pact government. Right now, we need to engage in extensive dialogue, because we cannot afford to be divided,” emphasizes Menko.
Martínez notes: “The hope is that we understand that, as peasants, we share a single identity, and that when one of us is attacked, we are all attacked. Now, unity is a necessity, not a whim.”
These days, the peasant movement is working to bring its base together, to clarify its analyses and proposals, and to move forward with our heads held high.
Elena Freedman is a popular educator and internationalist.
